《墨辩》中的认知与事实

English title: Cognition and fact in the Mo-bian

作者：德龙（Donald Sturgeon）
东吴大学哲学系研究生
MA student, Soochow University Department of Philosophy, Taipei

[提要]

　　这篇文章将要尝试以《墨辩》的文本资料为根据，从语言哲学的角度探讨《墨辩》中对认知与事实的看法，以及古代汉语对这些看法所造成的影响。

　　在有关认知与事实的部分，首先会讨论《墨辩》如何谈论不同类型的知识和不同认识活动。《墨辩》对语言的分析的一个很大的成就在於它较具体地描述了人透过与事物的接触而获得的直接认识和透过语言活动或理性思考得来的间接认识之间的关系。这一部分首先会提到《墨辩》中「知」的概念及其有关知识的分类和解释，然後说明《墨辩》如何使用「类」、「名」、「辞」来解释直接认识到间接认识的具体过程。依本文的看法，《墨辩》的作者对认知过程的解释大体上如下：人面对外在世界中的实存之物（实）首先通过感官能力（五路）观察到事物的某些性质（同异），然後根据这些性质形成有相同性质的概念（类），再把这些概念与被公认的语言符号相联结（名实耦），因而获得了用语言符号指称实存之物的能力（以名举实），并且通过这些语言符号来传达思想（以辞抒意）。这样，《墨辩》说明了透过语言表达的间接认识如何可能。

　　接下来文章会探讨《墨辩》有没有直接讨论到事实或真理的概念。在某一种意义上，每当我们说出一个判断的时候，我们已经有使用到真理这一概念；但有没有对真理概念本身进行反省是另外一个问题。《墨辩》当中确实有探讨跟真理和事实相关的一些概念，因此这一节要对这些概念作分析，并讨论《墨辩》中是否有谈到一种连接世界和语言的类似於「真理述词」的概念。《墨辩》很强调判断一定要根据客观的标准；这一部分还会通过对《墨辩》中「当」、「可」、「然」、「是」的分析厘清《墨辩》对事实的看法。

　　文章第二部分的主题是古代汉语对《墨辩》中有关认知与事实的理论和分析的可能影响。首先会提到西方汉学家陈汉生的「物质名词假设」及其与《墨辩》中的认知的关系。如果陈汉生的假设能够成立的话，它对《墨辩》作者的认知观念会有很大的意义；但本文将试图说明陈汉生的这一论证就《墨辩》而言是值得怀疑的。这一节一方面会从《墨辩》的「体」、「兼」观点分析，一方面用西方分析哲学家蒯因的「根本翻译」（radical translation）论起。

　　其次，本文将要分析古代汉语文法的灵活性与《墨辩》「名」、「辞」结构之间的关系。在这一节将会说明为什麽《墨辩》的「名」、「辞」结构与古代汉语的特徵密切相关，并且通过对〈小取篇〉的分析，具体地说明古代汉语如何影响了《墨辩》对语言的分析。

　　最後，将要从《墨辩》的立场面对古代中国有没有真理概念这一问题。这里又会从陈汉生的主张谈起，从《墨辩》的语言理论和语言哲学两个角度指出陈汉生「中国哲学没有真理概念」此一论证难以成立的理由。除了上述《墨辩》直接有关真理、事实问题的讨论之外，这些理由主要见在其论证的前提，包括「古代中国没有语句的概念」、「古代汉语只能表达『词信念』而无法表达『语句信念』」等。

关键词：墨辩、认知、事实、真理、物质名词

Cognition and fact in the Mo-bian

[Abstract]

This paper will attempt to use the text of the Mo-bian (Mohist dialectical chapters) to discuss Mohist ideas of cognition and fact, and the role the classical Chinese language may have played in influencing these ideas.

The first part of the paper will deal with cognition and fact, and will begin with how the Mo-bian discusses different kinds of knowledge and different kinds of cognition. A considerable achievement of the Mo-bian’s analysis of language was that it gave a relatively concrete picture of how we can progress from direct acquaintance acquired through direct contact with the world, to indirect acquaintance acquired through language or rational thought. This section will firstly discuss the Mo-bian’s conception and classification of zhi (knowledge), and then explain how Mo-bian used the concepts lei (class), ming (term), and ci (expression) to explain in concrete terms the progression from direct acquaintance to indirect acquaintance. This paper will argue that the author of the Mo-bian had the following view of cognition: faced with actual things in the external world (shi), we firstly use our five senses (wu lu) to distinguish properties of these things (tong-yi), then establish classes of things with similar properties, or concepts (lei), then tie these concepts to commonly recognized linguistic symbols, or names (ming shi ou), so acquiring the ability to use names to refer to actual things (yi ming ju shi), finally using complex expressions containing these names to express and transmit thoughts or ideas (yi ci shu yi).

Next I will discuss whether or not the Mo-bian talked directly about the concepts of fact and truth. In some sense, whenever we make a declarative statement, we have made use of the concept of truth; but whether or not we have reflected upon truth as a concept is a separate question. The Mo-bian did indeed discuss concepts related to truth and fact; here I will analyze these terms and discuss whether or not the Mo-bian mentioned a concept connecting language and reality similar to the truth predicate. The Mo-bian stressed that judgments should be made on the basis of objective standards; here I will use an analysis of dang, ke, ran and shi to explain the Mo-bian’s view of fact and truth.

The second part of the paper will discuss possible effects of classical Chinese on the Mohist analysis of cognition and fact. Firstly I will discuss Chad Hansen’s mass noun hypothesis and its relation to cognition in the Mo-bian. If the hypothesis were to hold, it would have great significance for the cognitive stance taken by the author of the Mo-bian; however I will attempt to show that it is doubtful whether the hypothesis can hold for the Mo-bian. This will be done on the one hand by an analysis of ti (part) and jian (whole), and on the other using Quine’s idea of radical translation.

Secondly, the paper will discuss the relation between the flexibility of classical Chinese grammar and the Mo-bian’s ming, ci structural analysis of language. Here I will attempt to show that this structural analysis is closely related to the flexibility of grammar. A detailed analysis of the xiao-qu chapter of the Mo-bian will be used as a concrete example of this.

Finally I will face the question of whether or not ancient China had a concept of truth from the Mohist position. Here I will proceed from a discussion of another of Chad Hansen’s theories, that “Chinese philosophy has no concept of truth”, and give reasons why this theory is problematic from the points of view of both the Mo-bian and philosophy of language. In addition to the previous discussion of the Mo-bian’s views on cognition and fact, these will include problems with Chad Hansen’s assumptions, such as that Chinese philosophy had no concept of a sentence, and that classical Chinese could only express so-called “term-belief” and not “sentential belief”.

Keywords: Mo-bian, Mohist dialectical chapters, cognition, fact, truth, mass nouns